Early Access - Why Not Destroy Radar during Battle of Britain?
Added 2020-09-02 21:02:47 +0000 UTCHey all,
Here is your early access to the next episode. In this video I talk about Radar during the Battle of Britain and whether the Luftwaffe should have taken it out. While reading up on this, I also noticed that very little has been written specifically on Chain Home during the Battle of Britain except for summaries and overall descriptions of the Dowding System. It would be interesting to see someone write an in-depth study in the future, as this topic might hold a lot of potential.
Overall, I think my answer at the moment would be that this is, as so many things, a question of compromises and I am not completely convinced that destroying Radar - in itself hard to do as I explain - would have changed 'that' much.
Happy watching and thanks for the support!
Chris
Comments
Hey Michael, glad you enjoyed it and thanks for the comment. Yes, that is definitely a well put advantage. Knowing the approximate time and heading of an attack reduces the need for forward observation over the channel, plus you know where to send the planes and can do so, as much as possible, on your own terms.
Military Aviation History
2020-09-06 20:38:16 +0000 UTCBased on my reading, one of the greatest advantages of radar was the reduction in the number of "dud patrols" flown before early warning systems were developed. Even if fighters reached the bombers after they dropped their loads, they usually reduced the number that flew additional missions. Since they saved fuel by being directed to the area of the raid, they were able to remain in the air long enough to down and damage many more bombers than they would have done by flying undirected patrols around the coast looking for something to shoot at. Even the bombers that escaped often came home with dead and wounded crewmen, which was said to have a chilling effect on bomber crew morale. This resulted in many raids jettisoning their loads and turning back when a large fighter force approached. This is all based on tales told by pilots of the battle to historians after the fact, and is therefore prejudiced. But given the limited range of interceptors of the day, having directed interceptions must have meant keeping more fighters in the area in the vicinity of the raids, and allowing them to remain long enough to do damage. All the above also applies to the work of the Observer Corps as well, perhaps more so. As you said, the biggest advantage might have been the communications system that allowed both radar stations and manned observation stations to warn of impending raids. it's also true that raids directed against Chain Home stations couldn't damage air bases, factories or transport between the two. Perhaps that's why modern forces spend so much time and money establishing the most effective communication systems possible. it's the old adage about the most dangerous man on the battlefield being the private on a hill with a radio! Thanks for another great educational video, Chris!
Michael Brewer
2020-09-06 20:00:31 +0000 UTCExcellent, Chris, thanks very much! The question of 'jamming' radar signals, as the RAF would later accomplish with "Window," goes back to your first point of Luftwaffe command levels in 1940 not integrating technological expertise with operational planning. Thanks again!
Timothy Mulligan
2020-09-03 00:19:23 +0000 UTCI think this is a very balanced view of the situation. We do emphasise Radar a lot when talking about the BoB, but in reality, it was just a link in the chain. As you say, it was useless once the bombers had crossed the coastline, but the 20-30 mins early warning was exceedingly useful - as Bomber Command and the 8thAF would find out to their cost as the war progressed and the roles reversed from defence to offence.
Julian Corbett
2020-09-02 23:18:47 +0000 UTC
