March Content Update: A Chronicle of the War in the Northwest Pt 1

Written on the Third Day of the Fourth Month of the Twenty-Fifth Reign of the Annesouais Emperor.

Your Grace,

I have arrived now in the northern anchor fortification of the Outer Outpost Line. The voyage from headquarters passed mostly calmly over open waters. Unfortunately, as we reached the coast, our convoy was attacked by a small squadron of ships belonging to the Great Enemy. Initially, the officers of the ship were hesitant to allow me to observe the action, but they yielded to my authority when I explained to them the nature of my commission.

The enemy's ships consisted of two small fast vessels of the common raiding configuration, with approximately 18 cannon on each flank. They approached as is their custom sailing against the wind, the better to drive our own convoy against them. Evidently, such tactics have become well-known to the men of the Northern Seas Fleet, and as a result, they proceeded very quickly to counter this approach, sending the escorts out as a screen, while bringing the Great Ships' broadsides to bear. Thus the Great Enemy was greeted with heavy fire from our rockets, causing heavy damage to both attackers. However, in their customary disregard for safety, both enemy vessels continued to approach, even while burning. While one vessel eventually broke apart under continued fire, the other was able to close to the range of its guns. I must regret to inform Your Grace that two Great Ships were heavily damaged, and three escorts sunk in the ensuing close action. Loss of life is estimated to be close to fifteen hundred.

In subsequent conversation with the officers of the ship, I have been informed that such actions were very common in the early days of the war, with many raiding squadrons of the Great Enemy penetrating deep past the Foremost and Outer Lines. This evidently caused great distress amongst the people of the Northern Dominions, doubly so when the Great Enemy was able to establish outposts within the perimeter of the Foremost Line. While these outposts and those who collaborated with them were eventually scoured clean and the perimeter itself was re-established, it remains something of a mystery to me how the carefully plotted defences of four successive Emperors could be pierced so easily. 

The explanation of this evident impossibility will likely serve as the main object of subsequent reports.

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4/8/Annesouais 25

Your Grace,

Having established myself now in the citadel, I have had the opportunity to begin the mission of investigation with which you have charged me. Over the past three days, I have accumulated several observations which I will elucidate upon here.

Firstly, Your Grace will be very gratified to know that the fortification is in a state of high readiness, and the mechanisms which exist to facilitate the transfer of troops and equipment to the front function at highest efficiency. Already the convoy which I have arrived upon has been rearmed and repaired, to transfer its cargo further forward. The courier ships are even more efficient. I am told that as I am writing this message, my first letter of four days ago may already be sitting in your most illustrious hands.

I have also had the opportunity to interview the local military commander, the Count of Fananne, whose family has held this posting since the establishment of the fortress over a century ago. This proved to be a very worrisome occasion, as while His Excellency the Count provided every hospitality, his preoccupations seemed to be less with the wider war effort and his own contributions to it, but in regards to the well-being of his own fortress and its supporting settlements, as well as relationships with the indigenous peoples, which have grown somewhat strained with the current increased demand for firewood, food, and other supplies which the war effort is in great need of. He has complained to me that what was sustainable with a population of 4000 has become nearly intolerable with the addition of the wartime garrison of 2500, and the constant transit of up to 15 000 troops at a time.

Even more worrisome was His Excellency's reaction when I prevailed upon him to offer his evaluation of the fortress' role in the wider strategic conception. For this, he referred me to his staff, mostly made up of officers which were assigned to him directly following the outbreak of war. The fact that the commander of a military district should be so ignorant of the role of his command in the wider plans of the Grand Staff that he must rely on others to even so much as exposit their significance seems a most unwelcome sign of some form of laxity or derangement within the structure of the local authority.

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4/18/Annesouais 25

Your Grace,

Having convened with the members of the Count's staff, I must regret to inform you that my worries regarding the matter have only grown.

It seems that they too share my complaints regarding the limited perspective of the local command, and were able to elaborate further on how such differences in perspective have hindered the war effort.

Simply put, while the staff maintains authority over the direction of the fortress and its supporting facilities as pertains to the war effort itself, the Count not only maintains ultimate command authority, but also seems to be the only figure of authority capable of effectively directing the local population, whose cooperation is strictly necessary for the harmonious function of the fortress' military roles. The staff may prevail upon him to carry out orders from the War Court, but they cannot prevail upon him to do so in the way which is not most advantageous for the local inhabitants, as opposed to that which contributes most greatly to the ultimate victory of the Great Kian and the House of J'ouwe.

Thus, cantonments are placed far away from docks to preserve the existing patterns of farmland. Ships' crews on shore duty are made to dig ditches and defences for local settlements instead of improving the dock facilities. Surplus equipment and supplies are handed out to outlying settlements who are threatened only by the possible raids of the indigenous peoples, instead of being stockpiled so that they may be kept in the case of encroachment or reverse at hands of the Great Enemy.

As a result, a theoretically unified command is in reality two separate command structures, one subordinate to the other, creating a state of affairs where local priorities are of greater import than overall priorities. While rectifying this state of affairs likely requires time and disruption which is unavailable in a time of exigency such as this, such matters should be considered and revisited once the proper opportunities arise.

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5/2/Annesouais 25

Your Grace,

I write with the confidence that my previous observations regarding the northern anchor of the Outer Outpost Line has been received and that the appropriate measures to rectify such faults as have been already enumerated are already in the process of being formulated by the relevant organs. As such, I would expect my work in this place to be more or less complete.

However, my findings here must raise a certain degree of concern independent of its immediate implications. Namely, it must be said that if matters of divided command and priority are so prominent here, in a position not so distant or disconnected from central authority, how might similar situations have developed further afield, in the environment of the Foremost Outpost Line? If one might speculate, it is possible that the greater danger and proximity of the Great Enemy's forces may have led to a more acceptable form of command process. Alternatively, distance from central command may have caused similar faults as such as those found here, or other malignant deviations entirely. Thus, I would seek permission to expand the scope of my current commission to evaluate the situation in that quarter.

I would further request the authority to inspect the smaller settlements and positions which form the broad arc of the Outer Outpost Line. As it has become clear that the maintenance and reinforcement of such positions are considered beyond the remit of the current station by His Excellency the Count of Fananne, an accurate accounting of the readiness of such posts would require further inspection by a disinterested party. Thus, I would request the opportunity to make my way to such outposts by land. While this would be a slower process, it will allow me to gain a greater appreciation of local conditions. I will also admit that I am somewhat apprehensive about travelling by sea given previous incidents. I have received some news that the activity of the Great Enemy has somewhat increased in the region over the past few weeks, and I am loath to require your grace to send a replacement so soon after my own appointment.