【國際冷知識 🇨🇳】 林和立教授的「習近平被動式認受」理論（一）「消極的合法性」等同「認受性」嗎？
Added 2026-01-28 02:01:01 +0000 UTC中國第一軍委副主席張又俠被整肅，為此在會員區訪問了中國問題研究學者林和立教授。他談及習近平的權力時，提出了一個看似互相矛盾、但又是客觀存在的論點：他認為習近平的權力很穩固，但如果真的穩固，又為何需要不斷整肅黨內高層，高層又為何接二連三疑似挑戰他的地位？對這個問題，他提出了「被動式認受」（Passive Acquiescence）這個概念。
這是很值得思考的概念，又很難三言兩語說情，這幾天我會嘗試做一些導讀：
討論世界各國的威權體制時，一個常見誤區，是把「沒有反對」直接等同於「真心支持」。但在現實中，許多人對政權的態度介於兩者之間：不願冒險對抗，也未必真心信奉；不會甘心被動員支持，但出現關鍵時刻、自己安全利益受損時，卻又不得不默認其統治，甚至在某些情境下表現出「站隊」式表演。
在林和立教授眼中，習近平既不斷被挑戰、又大權獨攬的現象，大概就是這樣。
學者張寅嫺年前在西方學術期刊《The China Journal》發表的文章，提供了一個有趣的概念工具：她借用學者蘇其曼（Suchman）的合法性框架，強調合法性可以包含主動支持與消極支持兩種面向：前者是積極認同與擁護，後者則是「接受現狀、視為不可避免」。至於《港區國安法》後的「新香港」是否一個例子，則自行判斷好了。
她進一步用這種現象，去研究中國網絡公共領域的長期變化，提出「消極政治合法性」（passive political legitimacy）概念：某個政權獲得支持，不一定靠本身做了什麼（或做得多好），也可能是因為人們在對外比較中，不再相信「外國勢力」可以幫助自己，又看見其他選項的各種潛在問題，從而對「民主—自由」的理想期待破滅，轉而在自認為沒有選擇之下，出現斯德哥爾摩症候群，慢慢地，就會對本國制度產生「相對滿意」。
另一位中國研究學者裴宜理（Elizabeth Perry）則把同一種「消極」，放到另一個關鍵場域：大學與知識界。她提出「受教育的默許」（educated acquiescence）概念，用以說明中國的高等教育無論多普及，都不會必然孕育自由民主，反而在特定條件下，會成為威權韌性的支柱：因為國家提供資源、地位、影響力與物質利益，同時由國家界定「成功」標準、並塑造學術活動，使學界以政治順從交換各種好處。就這樣，幾個世代的精英，就和既得利益集團結成「利益共同體」、「命運共同體」。
把兩篇研究放在一起，研究員看到「默許」不是單純的冷感或恐懼，而是一套由話語比較、資訊環境、制度誘因與管控技術共同生產的政治狀態。
那樣「默許」，又是什麼？
首先定義一下兩位學者對「默許」的定義，首先時態度。 態度上的默許，就是不覺得政權理想，但覺得「至少比別的選項好」、「現狀可接受」。
其次是行為。行為上的默許不會上街表態，也不會在網路上高喊口號；只要「不抵抗」、不組織反對、在規則框架內行動，就已經構成對統治秩序的變相認同。裴宜理的研究特別強調，在大學環境中，這種順從可以是制度性、日常化的，令整個學界作為系統，呈現出「政治合規」。
最後是制度。制度上的默許，就是當升遷、資源、聲望、研究經費、發表與評鑑等，都與官方設定的指標與優先序相連，一個個的個體就算內心不滿，也很可能選擇沉默或自我調整。裴宜理把這種狀態概括為：國家提供一套「吸引人的特權與利益包」，學界則以默許自己的政治順從，用來等價交換。
因此，「默許」不是「完全沒有政治」，而是政治以更低可見度、更高制度化的方式運作。
Comments
Whether the CMC no.2 is holding "real" power is a mythical issue. As powerful as Lin Biao during the cultural revolution, planning a coup was still almost impossible.
堅離地書院 College
2026-01-28 10:02:04 +0000 UTC這是關鍵，對政權而言，犬儒比相信政權更理想
堅離地書院 College
2026-01-28 10:00:06 +0000 UTC暴君都可獲「被動式認受」，可以濃縮成一個詞 ： 犬儒！ 充斥在當今中、港社會的，是不信政權，但也不相信人民力量，不相信真理、倫理、公義、道德 ... , 以什麼都不相信的態度，來支持自己消極，來支持不願意為改變不公而需承擔代價的立場。extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.cuhk.edu.hk/ics/21c/media/articles/c065-200101044.pdf
波路 保羅
2026-01-28 08:05:40 +0000 UTCDespite being part of a rolling, yearslong clean-out of the PLA’s upper ranks, purging a vice chairman of the Central Military Commission is still qualitatively different. This political theatre piece sends a strong message that no one is untouchable. The way serious allegations are packaged shows that the Chairman is dogged in his effort to crush any residual factionalism, warning others that their survival hinges not on connections or seniority but on absolute loyalty. The fall of Zhang has sent waves of fear crashing against the PLA's risk-averse command culture. Disobedience and disloyalty are fused into a single sin: deviation from the Party’s absolute control. It‘ll accelerate a shift toward political signaling and box-ticking, enabling the Party to exert greater authority in pursuing political ends while reducing honest reporting up the chain. Furthermore, more political commissars and internal security organs will be embedded in sensitive units within the PLA and the state-owned nuclear industry to centralize and tighten control over military command. The question haunting the CCP now is not whether a military coup was successfully nipped in the bud or whether Zhang Youxia leaked nuclear secrets to the US. The deeper concern is whether the CCP is succumbing to the same authoritarian decay that doomed so many regimes before it, as officers scramble to demonstrate their loyalty after witnessing their peers being taken down one after another. History suggests that totalitarian regimes often see periods of apparent stability and prosperity in the short to medium term. Yet time and again, the self‑inflicted isolation that comes with absolute power—reinforced by the paranoia of yes‑man military subordinates and the absence of independent technocrats—inevitably dulls judgment and erodes societal vitality. Tragically, many rulers convince themselves that they’re immune to the same forces and capable of dictating their own fate. In the end, instead of learning from their predecessors’ failures, they only meet a similar fate. Clearly, Xi Jinping now needs to find a way to not only pivot political apathy away from fear and paranoia caused by taking down the military circle of his own—including most trusted princeling—but conceive a plan to follow through his “Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” and the reunification with Taiwan. Meanwhile, Jake Sullivan in an interview with the NYT shared the impression Zhang left on him during their meeting in which he brought up “nuclear weapons in the context of China’s overall military buildup.” It’s unusual for a former national security advisor to speak so unequivocally about the character of a military heavyweight, especially in the wake of accusations of corruption, disloyalty to the Party and the country—which is seen as posing a serious threat to Xi’s absolute leadership—and leaking nuclear secrets to the US. Such remarks will no doubt deepen Xi’s suspicion of US infiltration within the Chinese military and spoil the genial atmosphere ahead of the Trump-Xi summit in April. The CCP’s politics is obscured by a veil of mist. It remains shrouded in secrecy whether the latest wave of purges targeting senior military leaders and other figures will derail Xi’s ambitions to reboot China’s economic engine and place Taiwan in his hands via hybrid warfare, or push him toward a reckless decision to invade Taiwan amid the growing rift between the US and NATO, acting before the hard‑power gap between the US and mainland China widens further. Yet judging from what appears to characterize his thinking, he’s unlikely to do an about-face on his goals, nor is he willing to own up to his mistakes. Yet judging from what appears to characterize his thinking, he’s unlikely to do an about-face on his goals, nor is he willing to own up to his mistakes. Against all odds, the CCP’s ambition remains and will continue pushing for great-power influence, a stronger nuclear deterrent, and regional dominance. And yet a system that constantly purges its own top commanders, and that is run by fear and absolute loyalty, becomes more brittle and more prone to miscalculation. Should history repeat itself, Xi, the CCP, all mainlanders, and much of the world would find themselves entangled in a major conflict with far-reaching economic and political consequences. For anyone caught in the vortex of mainland China's unique politics, the concept of “passive political legitimacy” and “educated acquiescence” offers a revealing glimpse into the deeper fabric of society. Nietzsche's warning feels uncomfortably apt: a people under a regime that defines itself by rewriting the rules of the game and hunting down “monsters” risks complying with and becoming indistinguishable from the very forces it originally claims to oppose. The deeper the Party stares into the abyss of its own purges, the more that abyss begins to shape both the mentality of its people and its own destiny, creating what it calls a “community of common destiny.”
George
2026-01-28 02:28:40 +0000 UTC
